Recently the medical profession has faced increasing outside pressure to reform postgraduate medical training programs to better equip young doctors for changing health care needs and public expectations. In this paper, we explore the impact of reform on professional self-governance by conducting a comparative historicalinstitutional analysis of postgraduate medical training reform in Britain and the Netherlands. In both countries, the medical training regime has shifted from professional self-regulation to co-regulation. Yet, there are notable differences in each country that cannot be solely explained by diverging institutional contexts. They also result from the strategic actions by the actors involved. Based on an assessment of the recent literature on institutional transformation, this paper shows how strategic actions set negotiating authority processes into motion, producing new and sometimes surprising institutional arrangements that can have profound effects on the distribution and allocation of authority in the medical training regime. The paper stresses the need to study the interactions between political context, the properties of institutions and negotiating authority processes, as they are crucially important to understanding institutional transformation.
Introduction
As a professional group par excellence, the medical profession is often described in terms of its authority and capacity to govern its own members (e.g. Larson 1977 , Freidson 2001 ). In the governance regime of medical professionals, professional training is considered a core institution, regulating both entry to the profession as well
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2 as the transfer of professional skills and habits. Despite considerable changes in health care policy regimes in the 20 th century, this core attribute of the professional medical community has remained largely uncontested. In the past decade, however, the medical profession has faced increasing outside pressure to reform training programs to improve patient safety and better equip young doctors for changing health care needs and public expectations (Ludmerer and Johns 2005; Drazen and Epstein 2002) . To that end, medical associations in various Western countries (e.g.
USA, Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands) have launched new vocational programs to meet revised standards in residency training, lifestyle, and preparation for supervisory roles (Ringsted et al. 2006: 437; Drolet et al. 2010; Fitzgibbons et al. 2006 ). Traditional apprenticeship-based programs, where residents gradually learn the skills and professional values of their specialty are being replaced by more structured and transparent training based on modern educational insights (Wallenburg et al. 2010) .
A growing body of sociological and medical educational literature has discussed these reforms in technical and methodological terms, addressing the kind of knowledge that should be transferred during medical training (Frank and Danoff 2007; Jones et al. 2001; Sales and Schlaff 2010) and how this should be done to prepare medical doctors for contemporary health care problems and changing public expectations (Teunissen et al. 2007; Schuwirth and van der Vleuten 2004) . In contrast, we wish to move past the technical account of medical educational reform and argue that contemporary reform of medical curricula has implications that go far beyond teaching method aspects and the educational content of medical curricula.
This article seeks to explore the impact of successive reforms of medical vocational training programs on the capacity and authority of the medical profession to govern its own affairs. Our empirical focus is on reforms in postgraduate medical We conducted a comparative historical-institutional analysis of the origins, evolution, and transformation of the British and Dutch postgraduate medical educational systems. In accordance with recent literature on institutional change, we consider institutional change as a gradual, incremental and continuous process in 3 which institutions are subject to frequent negotiations (Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Deeg and Jackson 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) . We explore the implications of this theoretical perspective on gradual and negotiated institutional change in section 2. In the empirical sections (sections 3-5), we show how medical training regimes in Britain and the Netherlands have evolved over time due to the dialectic relations between endogenous and exogenous forces touching upon vested interests and power relations in the domestic health care systems. In the conclusions we compare the cases and discuss the consequences of regime transformation for professional self-governance. We argue that in both countries professional selfgovernance has turned into more hybrid forms of co-regulation in which the medical profession, the state, and other private actors continuously reinstate their positions and related claims to authority. This shift to co-regulation also becomes visible in everyday clinical training practice where the traditional training-and-license models are increasingly supplemented, or replaced by more formal instruction, performance measurement and standardized practices of resident training, in order to enhance transparency and accountability of medical training. We argue that this enhanced visibility of former closed training practices may provide other stakeholders with new means to further reform postgraduate medical education and, with that, strengthen their authority in the medical training regime We conclude by elaborating on the implications of this study for contemporary debates on institutional change.
Transforming the Medical Training Regime

A Social Regime Approach
This article focuses on the transformation of one of the core institutions of the medical profession: the ownership and accompanying authority and autonomy of physicians over the vocational programs of medical professional training. Here we term the governance structure of medical training a 'training regime' embodying the distinct institutional configurations and agencies involved in medical training.
Specifically, regimes are defined as "a set of rules stipulating expected behavior and 'ruling out' behavior deemed to be undesirable. A regime is legitimate to the extent that the expectations it represents are enforced by the society in which it is embedded" (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 12-13) . Actors in the regime have explicitly undertaken to respect certain interest positions of other parties (including those not directly involved), to pursue certain substantive goals and values, and to follow certain procedures in their future interactions (Scharpf 1997) . As such, regimes create order and stability in an otherwise chaotic and anarchic world.
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In order to understand the genesis, reproduction and change of a social regime, three important characteristics of regimes should be noted. Firstly, in terms of their composition, regimes are typically structured by a host of different institutions, together constituting an institutional configuration that makes up a regime. The actors involved can be seen as 'purposeful', meaning that they have their own interests and may undertake their own strategies to pursue their goals. Secondly, regimes can be specified at different levels of breadth, that is, they are embedded or nested in other regimes (Hood et al. 2001:10) . The medical training regime, for example, is embedded in the overarching regime of the health care system. Given physicians' central stake in health care, a medical training regime can in turn be regarded as one of the constituting regimes of any health care regime, meaning that changes in the medical training system may have profound effects on medical governance in general-and the other way around.
Thirdly, any distinct regime consists of a configuration of institutions, some with deeper roots ('more important') than others. Reforming these institutions is likely to be harder and more politicized than reforming institutions located more in the periphery of an institutional configuration. We refer to these deeply rooted institutions as 'core institutions'. Although core institutions are complemented by other institutions, they are likely to dominate the governance mode in any regime and thus impose their logic on the institutional configuration of a regime as a whole. Core institutions are also dominant in terms of their authority claim in distinct regimes.
In short, different sub-regimes and their accompanying institutional arrangements interact in the overarching social regime. To understand regime transformation, then, we should study the different sub-regimes, their mutual relationships, as well as any changes in one sub-regime that might spill over to the others. This analysis requires a subtle approach to the analysis of institutional change.
Regime Transformation: Negotiating Power and Authority
Institutions can be defined as the formal and informal rules of the game providing political agents with incentives and constraints that induce stable patterns of behavior. Institutional analysis generally shares an emphasis on the constraining character of institutions. Increasing returns, sunk costs, and positive feedback are powerful mechanisms that make institutional change largely path-dependent (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000) . In the path dependency view, institutional change is usually explained in two ways: either as minor, usually continuous change (seen most often) or as major change caused by some sort of exogenous shock opening up existing 5 paths (seen rarely) (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8) . In the absence of analytical tools to characterize and explain more gradual institutional change, much of the institutional literature has relied-explicitly or implicitly-on a strongly punctuated-equilibrium model that draws on overly sharp distinctions between long periods of institutional stasis periodically interrupted by 'critical junctures' allowing for more or less radical reorganization (Tuohy 1999; True et al. 2007) .
A growing body of literature is currently questioning these ideas of institutional resistance to change; for a discussion on this topic see also a special issue of this journal (JHPPL, August 2010). 1 Scholars writing in the realm of institutional change display what Deeg and Jackson (2007) have called "a greater plasticity" of institutional evolution, meaning that institutional change is essentially a gradual and evolutionary process (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Hacker 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) . Beyond the conventional view of institutions as stable constructs that owe their stability to powerful policy legacies and path-dependent processes, the authors point out that institutional change is essentially a gradual evolutionary process. The determinants of institutional change not only come from outside, but can also be produced endogenously by the very behavior that the institutions themselves have generated. In this view, a far more dynamic component is built in, wherein institutions represent compromises of relatively durable though still contested settlements based on specific coalitional dynamics. These coalitions, however, are always vulnerable to shifts as institutional rules are subject to varying interpretations and levels of enforcement. Therefore, they exhibit ambiguities that provide space for interested agents to exploit their efforts to alter them (Thelen 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) .
To understand these more gradual and incremental processes of institutional evolvement, one should consider the mechanisms of reproduction that help to sustain these institutions over time as well as the changes in institutions that gradually transform them into new directions. Institutional change can best be understood in terms of the 'co-evolution' of multiple institutions in a social regime (Thelen 2004: 32 
Medical Governance in Britain and the Netherlands
Since its inception in 1948, the British NHS system has been based on the principle of universal free access to state-provided health care funded by taxation. Hospital specialists are salaried employees of state-owned hospitals, and general practitioners work as independent contractors with the NHS.
The Dutch health care system can be portrayed as a neo-corporatist associational system with predominantly public funding and privately owned and operated health care providers. Contrary to their British colleagues, most Dutch physicians work in entrepreneurial medical specialty partnerships (maatschappen) in association with a hospital. Notwithstanding these differences, the medical profession has always possessed considerable self-regulatory authority in both countries.
In the Netherlands, medical self-regulation fits in nicely with the corporatist system in which the state has major constitutional responsibilities but depends highly on privately working professional practitioners and private not-for profit institutions to accomplish this (Helderman, 2007) . An independent regulatory body, the GMC is involved in quality regulation of the medical profession as a whole (Irvine 2006) .
A comparative analysis of the transformation of medical training regimes in
Britain and the Netherlands thus seem to fit a most different case design (George and Bennett 2005) . While Britain and the Netherlands differ in important institutional characteristics of their health care systems, when it comes to the self-regulatory authority of medical doctors, they share important similarities. In the last two decades, however, the self-regulatory capacity of the medical profession has increasingly been challenged by a number of exogenous developments.
In Britain, the introduction of the internal market and performance indicators had an important effect. The Thatcher government introduced the internal market in 1991, in an attempt to reduce health care budgets and create more efficiency in public sector spending. Central elements were the introduction of a purchaserprovider split and a system of provider competition in which money would follow the patient (Bevan and Robinson 2005) . After the Labour party returned to power in 1997, successive governments more or less continued the policies of the internal market, with more emphasis on performance control and state-based regulation (Helderman et al. 2011) . As a result, medical practitioners have been confronted with many managerial instruments such as standards of good practice and procedures for monitoring, evaluating, and sanctioning medical performance Robinson 2005, Helderman et al. 2011 ).
The Netherlands went even further in the reform attempt by enacting a new health insurance system and incorporating a system of regulated competition in its corporatist health care system. The reforms began with the Dekker Commission advisory report of 1987 but it took almost 20 years before the suggested reforms were fully implemented. Meanwhile incremental changes were made to enhance the institutional and technical feasibility of regulated competition, while keeping control over health care supply and prices (Helderman et al. 2005) . The new Health
Insurance Act was finally enacted on January 1, 2006, also considered the date on which the Dutch turned to the system of regulated competition. Citizens can now choose between health insurers, while health care insurers aim to contract efficient care of good quality with competing health care providers. Despite the current emphasis on competition, Dutch health care is still heavily regulated to contain macro healthcare expenditures and guarantee equity (Helderman 2007) .
Against the background of these overarching system-level reforms the reform of medical training regimes became increasingly politicized in both countries in the 2000s. However, the way these system-level reforms interfered with the more 9 gradual and endogenous modernization of the medical training regimes asks for a subtle and detailed analysis of medical training reform. In the next two sections, we focus specifically on the origins, evolution, and transformation of medical training regimes in Britain and the Netherlands.
Medical Vocational Training Reform in Britain
Enhancing Unity in British Medical Education
In the early 19 th century, Britain had no structured system of medical education.
There was extreme variation in the quality of medical education and thus in the quality of medical practitioners (Nutton 1995) . This slowly started to change with the introduction of the Medical Act in 1858, when the medical profession was confronted by a fast-developing body of medical knowledge, which increasingly made clear the distinction between real medical treatment and quackery. The profession felt an increasing need to set up a registration system to distinguish good doctors from the bad. A registration system would also enhance the social status and income of physicians as it would establish a monopoly on medical care (Loudon 1995) . The establishment of the registration system meant a significant push toward skill standardization, which was further enhanced by the 1858 Act's requirement to follow a four-year Bachelor's degree to practice medicine. The General Council of Medical Education and Registration was also established through the Medical Act. It was abbreviated to General Medical Council (GMC) in 1951. The GMC was licensed to provide a register of qualified doctors and had to ensure adequate standards for medical education. Originally, the GMC was appointed an independent authority funded by physicians' mandatory payments. All council members were medical practitioners representing various medical corporations. In daily practice, however, the Royal Medical Colleges set and controlled the standards and practices for their
specialties. Yet, training practices-and outcomes-varied considerably due to local circumstances.
With the introduction of the NHS, the professionally dominated system remained largely intact. However, because of the importance of medical education to the quality of health service provision and the fact that medical education was mainly paid from NHS resources, medical education increasingly became a political concern. Initially, political involvement was mainly restricted to undergraduate Practitioners Act. The Act launched a new GMC, including lay membership in order to influence the GMC's thinking from outside the profession (Stacey 1992) . It also established a special education committee inside the GMC to coordinate all stages of medical education. However, in everyday practice it appeared difficult for the GMC to fulfill this role because of the increasing authority of the Royal Medical Colleges over medical affairs due to fast medical technological development and associated specialization.
Although neither inquiry led directly to fundamental changes in the British medical training regime, they did however redirect attention to expectations and interests outside medical education and sowed the seed for more outside interference in medical vocational training in subsequent decades. In other words, medical training was no longer the exclusive domain of the medical profession.
Building and Losing Trust in the British Medical Training Regime
In the mid 1990s newly introduced European legislation required significant changes Right from the start, the system was heavily criticized by candidates and local assessors. There were serious concerns that the best applicants were not being short-listed for interviews. Moreover, the number of applicants was far higher than expected due to overseas applicants as well as applications from doctors already in the system who so far had not had good career opportunities. This created fierce essential to ensure plans are co-owned and supported to ensure that those with insight into the likely evolution of specialty practice are able to influence policy" (Tooke 2008:97) . They proposed establishing an independent, professional-led advisory body for medical training and education, further recommending a merger of PMETB and GMC. Despite some reluctance, the government agreed with the merger of PMETB and the GMC, which became effective in 2010. A few months later, Lord Darzi's report NHS Next Stage Review was published, announcing the creation of Medical Education England (MEE) as an independent non-departmental advisory board to be headed by a physician. This body has to ensure that "policy, professional, and service perspectives are integrated in the curricula" (Darzi 2008:73) . Note here that the authority over medical vocational training is not handed back to the Royal Medical Colleges. Instead, the medical training regime has become 15 increasingly co-regulated by independent bodies comprising both professional, lay and government members.
At first sight, MMC may be considered a classical critical juncture, opening up a window of opportunity for the involvement of external stakeholders in the medical training regime. In this classical portray of institutional change, institutional development is envisioned as long periods of institutional stability alternating with brief periods of revolutionary upheaval in which there is room for more substantial changes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Helderman 2007) . The historical-institutional analysis presented above, however, reveals a far more gradual and evolutionary reform process. Indeed, the medical training regime as a professional-controlled system had already started to transform into a more co-regulated regime in the 
Medical Vocational Training Reform in the Netherlands
Establishing a Self-regulatory Structure for Medical Education
Similar to Britain, the Netherlands of the 19 th century lacked any formal certification and examination system to assess the quality of training that apprentices received in a given workplace. This slowly started to change with the establishment of the Dutch Medical Association (NMG) in 1849. The NMG had to overcome practical differences by enhancing the unity and status of the medical profession (Goudsmit 1978) . One measure it introduced was a university-based medical curriculum to train doctors with uniform authority. Overall, the role of the government in medical education was restricted to subsidizing medical faculties.
Increasing specialization between 1900 and 1930 enhanced the competition between generalist and specialist practitioners, threatening the hard-won unity of the medical profession. Most doctors realized that further formalization of specialization was necessary to, as one of the medical leaders pointed out, 'prevent chaos and ensure quality' (Klazinga 1996) . In 1931, the Specialist Registration Commission was established, aimed not only to register medical specialists but also to set formal requirements for medical curricula and select the hospitals that would become training sites.
After World War II successive Dutch governments tried to gain more control of medical education, mainly driven by concerns about rising health care costs.
Initially, measures were directed only at undergraduate medical education as the medical associations successfully resisted external interference in their postgraduate training programs. In the early 1950s, however, after rising complaints about the quality of hospitals selected as training sites, the government installed a state commission to investigate medical vocational training (Klazinga 1996) . This inquiry The CCMS, which fell under the aegis of the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) had to regulate and control the quality of medical training. The ten years needed to create this board, prior to its establishment, reflect the severe negotiations between the medical associations and the government about the composition and authority assigned to the board. In its final appearance, it comprised members of the medical associations and medical faculties, as well as representatives from the government and teaching hospitals. Although government and hospitals thus became formally involved in medical vocational training-adding a new layer to the existing 17 system dominated by professionals-medical practitioners still held a majority of seats and dominated the board's policies and decisions (Klazinga 1996) .
By this time, the quality requirements of medical curricula were discussed mainly in terms of years of training at a selected training site and the skills of the educator. This changed in the 1980s when requirements were sharpened because a rising number of medical residents had put the capacity of the old master/trainee system under pressure. The CCMS, in consultation with the specialty associations, formulated new requirements to improve training quality, such as a minimal number of hospital beds and the number of patient contacts. External peer-reviewed site-visit programs for teaching hospitals were introduced to monitor and assess the quality of local training programs (van Herk et al. 2001) . Although these measures enhanced the formalization of the medical training system, it was also widely recognized that many of the requirements were not met in daily practice (Klazinga 1996) .
At the same time, government interference in postgraduate medical education increased. This was mainly due to an increasing felt need to adapt the number of doctors-in-training to future health care expectations. To this end, the Capacity Board was established in 1999. Typically for the Dutch corporatist system, this board was an independent body set up by the Ministry of Health in close collaboration with the medical associations, health insurers and hospital associations. Yearly, the board determines the number of training posts for each medical specialty. These numbers are only maximums, however, meaning that a specific specialty association can also decide not to fill all posts, for example when fearing over-capacity (Frissen 2008) . 
Adapting to New Requirements
By the late 1990s, medical professional leaders and politicians were increasingly arguing that medical curricula were not keeping up with major changes in the health care arena. An important turning point was marked by a speech by the then Minister of Health, Els Borst-Eilers, addressed to the Dutch Medical Association in 1999.
Minister Borst, a physician before entering politics, drew attention to upcoming changes in health care, such as an increasing need for technically skilled healthcare workers who are also good communicators and organizers of care. The minister stressed the need for more efficient training and a shorter training trajectory. Reforms of the medical curricula were necessary to accomplish this, she argued. Typically for the public-private dependency in Dutch medical governance, the minister's appeal for reform was followed by two policy documents, one by the medical association, the other by a government appointed commission. The first was Tomorrow's Doctors medical curricula had to be redesigned following a competency-based model that specified clear end terms. In addition, residents' skills had to be tested regularly using special clinical assessment tools. Overall, the reforms can best be understood as an attempt to render medical vocational training in a more formal and transparent structure, without losing professional values and the traditional method of apprenticeship-based learning. In daily practice, the training reforms focused strongly on restructuring individual training schemes and the use of modern educational tools.
Educational specialists, who had no access to postgraduate medical education before, were hired to implement the reforms. Special courses were developed to teach the doctors how to work with the new teaching and evaluation methods.
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So, the reforms that started as an attempt to keep up with changing health care demands were gradually reframed as educational improvements to existing training programs, yet without making any substantial changes to the governance structure (de Bont et al. 2008) .
By this time, however, the medical profession had to face significant policy developments that also impinged on their self-regulating capacity in medical training. 
Defending and Redefining Professional Jurisdictions
The medical profession soon realized that "they had sold their autonomy to the 
Conclusions
A comparative analysis of the transformation of medical training regimes in Britain and the Netherlands comes close to a classical most different case design (George and Bennett 2005) in the sense that both countries differ on many institutional characteristics except for one crucial independent variable, namely, the selfregulatory authority of the medical profession with regard to their vocational training programs. The paper has demonstrated that in Britain and the Netherlands medical training regimes have transformed from predominantly professionally-controlled systems into regimes of co-regulation. There are important differences between the two countries in terms of the strategies that were enacted as well as in the nature of the interactions between the medical profession, state and other stakeholders, which can be explained from the nested institutional structure of both countries.
Nonetheless, the outcomes of the reform of the two medical training regimes were quite similar. In Britain and the Netherlands medical professional bodies had to give up their monopoly in professional training and increasingly had to share power with other stakeholders. Yet, in the end, in both countries reforms got politicized, and contested, when they touched upon the core institution of medical training regimes:
the recruitment of new trainees.
In Britain, the increasing emphasis on medical performance management and the government's subsequent attempt to wield medical education to improve the NHS, led to MMC and the highly contested new recruitment system. In the Analytically, the paper shows that the self-governance of medical professional training cannot be fully explained by a model of countervailing powers but requires a more dynamic explanatory approach directed at the co-evolution of changes in multiple institutions that make up an institutional configuration. In Britain and the Netherlands medical training regimes co-evolved with systemic health care reforms.
Initially, these reforms were located in the periphery of the medical training regime.
However, as soon as the reforms touched upon the core institutions of the medical training regimes, co-evolution became far more politicized, ending up in a clash of contradicting authority claims. Indeed, MMC entailed a much wider reform than the introduction of the MTAS but its failure had a large impact on other forms of external involvement in postgraduate medical training as well.
Overall, this article adds to the current debate on institutional transformation by demonstrating the necessity of detailed empirical analysis to our understanding of on-and off-path change. Subtle analysis allows us to gain insight into the ongoing processes of negotiation on authority in distinct social regimes, and the mediating role that institutions play in this. Importantly, as we have tried to show, such analysis also helps to unpack the more unexpected and unpredictable transformations in a social policy regime. In general, our analysis of institutional change in complex policy systems such as health care stresses the need to study the interaction between aspects of the political context, the properties of institutions and the process of negotiation and renegotiation between the actors involved. All are crucially important to the understanding of institutional transformation. Especially in a critical case such 24 as the self-governance of medical doctors and their accompanying authority claims over their medical training regimes.
